Just a smidge ana from there. No, a little kata now. Perfect!

Sum­mary: I am going to ask a ques­tion about what seems to be sim­ple dif­fer­en­tial geom­e­try. It may be just about lin­ear alge­bra. Me, I was a biol­o­gist for too long to remem­ber any of this, alas. But I sup­pose since I’m a stu­dent these days, I should point out that it’s not for home­work — it’s for an amus­ing project in genetic pro­gram­ming. But I really don’t have the math­e­mat­ics to answer it with any cer­tainty. So… any­body? help?

Say we have two points in two dimen­sions. Call them A and B. Together, A and B suf­fice to uniquely define a line, as long as they’re not coin­ci­dent. As an ordered pair, (A,B) can be used to define a half-​​space in the plane: we can just, for instance, take the half of the plane that lies counter-​​clockwise from the vec­tor con­nect­ing A to B. Pos­i­tive axes, and all that. The line pass­ing through AB is a hyper­plane of dimen­sion 1 lying in 2-​​space.

OK. Same drill in three-​​space. Three points A, B and C uniquely define a plane (which is itself 2-​​dimensional), as long as they’re not co-​​linear. We can take the ordered triple (A,B,C) and apply the right-​​hand rule to pick one side of the plane, and define a half-​​space.

You know where we’re going. Four dimen­sions. Four points uniquely define a 3D hyper­plane, as long as they’re not copla­nar (I sup­pose). That’s OK. Gen­er­ally, in n dimen­sions, n points will uniquely define an n–1 dimen­sional hyper­plane, as long as they’re lin­early inde­pen­dent. But. But.

Does the ordered tuple (A,B,C,D) suf­fice to denote a unique half-​​space? I can see how it might, and at the same time I can see how it might not. Because there’s no clear def­i­n­i­tion of the cross prod­uct in 4D, so… what’s the equiv­a­lent of the right-​​hand rule? The top-​​hand rule, which will point in the anawards direc­tion when you have your fore­fin­ger point­ing in the first direc­tion, your mid­dle fin­ger in the sec­ond direc­tion, and your ring fin­ger point­ing in the third direction?

Ow. Oh, cool! My top thumb… like, dis­ap­peared. And here it is back again. Hunh.

Any­way.

Really, all I want to be able to do is come up with an unam­bigu­ous method for defin­ing a spe­cific half-​​space in n dimen­sions using n lin­early inde­pen­dent points, (x1,x2,x3…xn). And I want the ordered tuple to be the only cue we use. Does it suffice?

If so, is it just the direc­tion orthog­o­nal to the all rays (x1,x2), (x2,x3), (x3,x4) … and (xn-​​1,xn)?

If you’re going to be awake in the middle of the night anyway…

…then you may as well have a few dis­turb­ing thoughts to while away the time.

So here I am. I am plan­ning on cre­at­ing advanced real-​​tuime deci­sion sup­port sys­tems, aimed at insti­tu­tions. These are, on the face of it, sup­posed to enable these insti­tu­tions (cor­po­ra­tions, schools, gov­ern­men­tal bod­ies, &c) to make deci­sions faster — to speed up, as it were. To become more agile, respon­sive, reac­tive. Adept, while still being distributed.

Recently I’ve been in the habit of point­ing out that the one big advan­tage indi­vid­ual peo­ple have over insti­tu­tions is their rel­a­tive speed. Col­lec­tives are slow. Cor­po­ra­tions don’t think like peo­ple, don’t make deci­sions like peo­ple do — indeed, it can be a dif­fi­cult stance to ascribe them beliefs, desires or inten­tions of their own. (Their lead­ers cer­tainly have those traits; whether they sync with the collective’s actions is another mat­ter, of some inter­est). But then again, we live in a time when cor­po­ra­tions are treated by the law as rich but rather slow indi­vid­u­als. And at the same time we begin to thinnk of mobs as smart, and crowds wise.

Sci­ence fic­tion tropes (and, by the obvi­ous exten­sion, sci­ence tropes) all seem to imag­ine that the first man-​​made human-​​competitive intel­lects will be software-​​based. What if they run purely in wet­ware?

What might it mean to uplift a corporation?

I can imag­ine blun­der­ing Uplifted Com­mit­tees wan­der­ing the earth, mak­ing arbi­trary edi­to­r­ial deci­sions and cater­ing to innu­mer­able spe­cial inter­ests — in real­time. I can see an era when the actual cor­po­rate defen­dant can appear in court when sued. What would the world be like with Microsoft Embod­ied? (A lot more like Power Rangers, I spect).

Who ever thought an arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence — or rather non– or quasi-​​human intel­li­gence — had to be smart, polite, or useful?

How would you test that?

I. Am. In. Class.

In. This. Class. The. Pro­fes­sor. Is. Writ­ing. And. Debug­ging. Fuck­ing. ASP. dot. NET. Code. On. His. Lap­top. In. Front. Of. The. Class.

It. Is. NOT. Compiling.

There. Are. No. Unit. Tests.

So he is star­ing at it, chang­ing ran­dom crap, and recom­pil­ing to see what happens.

Nobody. Is. Learning.

Not. Him. Either.

There are cor­rect words for this. The word is not ennuitic. The word is not frus­trat­ing. Not ridicu­lous. Not unpro­duc­tive. Not even exas­per­at­ing.

I don’t think the word is an Eng­lish word. It would need to encom­pass all of those.

This is the sort of thing that makes me feel bad, on so many lev­els, about grad­u­ate school. For me, for the instruc­tor, for the Sys­tem. All bro­ken. All stuck, each with the other.

What I’m reading tonight: Aristophanes was a real funny asshole

Over at Dis­trib­uted Proof­read­ers, tonight I’m read­ing a piece from an old mag­a­zine we scanned sev­eral months back. If you want a sense of how hard it is, it took me about fif­teen min­utes to scan the fol­low­ing for errors — our OCR is pretty good.

Please con­sider going and vol­un­teer­ing a few min­utes of your time there. It’s easy, it’s fun, and it’s good for the world.

From The Mir­ror of Taste and Dra­matic Cen­sor, Vol I No. 4, 1831:

HISTORY OF THE STAGE. CHAPTER IV.ORIGIN OF COMEDYARISTOPHANESDEATH OF SOCRATES.

Though the term “tragedy” has from the first pro­duc­tions of Æschy­lus to the present time, been exclu­sively appro­pri­ated to actions of a seri­ous nature and melan­choly cat­a­stro­phe, there is rea­son to believe that it orig­i­nally included also exhi­bi­tions of a pleas­ant, or comic kind. The rude satires, and gross mum­mery which occu­pied the stage, or rather the cart, of Thes­pis, were cer­tainly cal­cu­lated to pro­voke mirth in the mul­ti­tude. By what has already been shown, the reader is apprised that the word, in its orig­i­nal sense, bore no rela­tion what­ever to those pas­sions and sub­jects, to the rep­re­sen­ta­tions of which it is now applied; but meant sim­ply a dra­matic action per­formed at the feast of the goat, in hon­our of Bac­chus. Thus the dif­fer­ent provinces of the drama then undis­tin­guished, were con­founded under one term, and con­sti­tuted the prime trunk from which sprung forth the two branches of tragedy and com­edy separately—the first in point of time usurp­ing the orig­i­nal title of the par­ent stock, and retain­ing it ever after.

Why human crea­tures should take delight in wit­ness­ing fic­ti­tious rep­re­sen­ta­tions of the anguish and mis­for­tunes of their fellow-​​beings, in tragedy, and, in com­edy of those fol­lies, foibles and imper­fec­tions which degrade their nature, is a ques­tion which many have asked, but few have been able to answer. The facts are admit­ted. Towards a solu­tion of their causes, let us con­sider what is said on the sub­ject of tragedy in that invalu­able work “A philo­soph­i­cal inquiry into the ori­gin of our ideas of the sub­lime and beau­ti­ful.”

It is a com­mon obser­va­tion,” says the author, in the chap­ter on sym­pa­thy and its effects, “that objects which in the real­ity would shock, are, in trag­i­cal and such like rep­re­sen­ta­tions, the source of a very high species of plea­sure. This taken as a fact, has been the cause of much rea­son­ing. The sat­is­fac­tion has been com­monly attrib­uted, first to the com­fort we receive in con­sid­er­ing that so melan­choly a story is no more than a fic­tion; and next to the con­tem­pla­tion of our own free­dom from the evils which we see rep­re­sented. I am afraid it is a prac­tice much too com­mon in inquiries of this nature, to attribute the cause of feel­ings, which merely arise from the mechan­i­cal struc­ture of our bod­ies, or from the nat­ural frame and con­struc­tion of our minds, to cer­tain con­clu­sions of the rea­son­ing fac­ulty on the objects pre­sented to us: for I should imag­ine that the influ­ence of rea­son, in pro­duc­ing our pas­sions, is noth­ing near so exten­sive as is com­monly believed.

To exam­ine this point, con­cern­ing the effect of tragedy in a proper man­ner, we must pre­vi­ously con­sider how we are affected by the feel­ings of our fellow-​​creatures, in cir­cum­stances of real dis­tress. I am con­vinced we have a degree of delight, and that no small one, in the real mis­for­tunes and pains of oth­ers; for let the affec­tion be what it will in appear­ance, if it does not make us shun such objects, if, on the con­trary, it induces us to approach them, if it makes us dwell upon them, in this case we must have a delight or plea­sure of some species or other in con­tem­plat­ing objects of this kind.

Do we not read the authen­tic his­to­ries of scenes of this nature with as much plea­sure as romances or poems, where the inci­dents are fic­ti­tious? The pros­per­ity of no empire, nor the grandeur of no king, can so agree­ably affect in the read­ing, as the ruin of the state of Mace­don and the dis­tress of its unhappy prince. Such a cat­a­stro­phe touches us in his­tory, as much as the destruc­tion of Troy does in fable. Our delight in cases of this kind is very greatly height­ened if the suf­ferer be some excel­lent per­son who sinks under an unwor­thy for­tune. Sci­pio and Cato are both vir­tu­ous char­ac­ters, but we are more deeply affected by the vio­lent death of the one, and the ruin of the great cause he adhered to, than with the deserved tri­umphs and unin­ter­rupted pros­per­ity of the other; for ter­ror is a pas­sion which always pro­duces delight when it does not press too close; and pity is a pas­sion accom­pa­nied with plea­sure, because it arises from love raid social affec­tion. When­ever we are formed by nature to any active pur­pose, the pas­sion which ani­mates us to it is attended with delight; and as our cre­ator has designed we should be united by the bond of sym­pa­thy, he has strength­ened that bond by a pro­por­tion­able delight; and there most, where our sym­pa­thy is most wanted, in the dis­tresses of oth­ers. If this pas­sion was sim­ply painful we should shun with the great­est care all per­sons and places that could excite such a pas­sion; as some, who are so far gone in indo­lence as not to endure any strong impres­sion, actu­ally do. But the case is widely dif­fer­ent with the greater part of mankind; there is no spec­ta­cle we so eagerly pur­sue as that of some uncom­mon and griev­ous calamity; so that whether the mis­for­tune is before our eyes, or whether they are turned back to it in his­tory, it always touches with delight. This is not an unmixed delight, but blended with no small uneasi­ness. The delight we have in such things, hin­ders us from shun­ning scenes of mis­ery; and the pain We feel prompts us to relieve our­selves in reliev­ing those who suf­fer; and all this antecedent to any rea­son­ing by an instinct that works us to its own pur­poses with­out our concurrence.”

The great author then pro­ceeds to illus­trate this posi­tion fur­ther, and after some obser­va­tions says:

The nearer tragedy approaches the real­ity, and the fur­ther it removes us from all ideas of fic­tion, the more per­fect is its power. But be its power what it will, it never approaches to what it rep­re­sents. Choose a day to rep­re­sent the most sub­lime and affect­ing tragedy we have; appoint the most favourite actors; spare no cost upon the scenes and dec­o­ra­tions; unite the great­est efforts of poetry, paint­ing and music; and when you have col­lected your audi­ence, just when their minds are erect with expec­ta­tion, let it be reported that a state crim­i­nal of high rank is on the point of being exe­cuted in the adjoin­ing square; in a moment the empti­ness of the the­atre would demon­strate the com­par­a­tive weak­ness of the imi­ta­tive arts, and pro­claim the tri­umph of the real sym­pa­thy. This notion of our hav­ing a sim­ple pain in the real­ity, yet a delight in the rep­re­sen­ta­tion, arises hence, that we do not suf­fi­ciently dis­tin­guish what we would by no means choose to do, from what we should be eager enough to see, if it was once done. We delight in see­ing things which so far from doing, our hearti­est wishes would be, to see redressed. This noble cap­i­tal, the pride of Eng­land and of Europe, I believe no man is so strangely wicked as to desire to see destroyed by a con­fla­gra­tion or an earth­quake, though he should be removed him­self to the great­est dis­tance from the dan­ger. But sup­pose such a fatal acci­dent to have hap­pened, what num­bers from all parts would crowd to behold the ruins, and among them many who would have been con­tent never to have seen Lon­don in its glory.”

So much for the causes of the plea­sure expe­ri­enced from tragedy. But how are we to account for the delight received from com­edy? Some have imag­ined it to arise from a bad pride which men feel at see­ing their fellow-​​creatures humil­i­ated, and the frail­ties and fol­lies of their neigh­bours exposed. The fact is indu­bitable, be the cause what it may. The great moral philoso­pher quoted above, in another part of his works, shrewdly observes, “In the dis­as­ters of their friends, peo­ple are sel­dom want­ing in a laud­able patience. When they are such as do not threaten to end fatally, they become even mat­ter of pleas­antry.” The falling of a per­son in the street, or his plung­ing into the gut­ter, excites the laugh­ter of those who wit­ness the acci­dent: but let the fall be dan­ger­ous, or let a bone be broke, and then comic feel­ings give way to the sym­pa­thetic emo­tions which belong to tragedy. On a super­fi­cial con­sid­er­a­tion, the delight we feel in tragedy bears the aspect of a cruel ten­dency in our hearts, yet it is implanted in us for the pur­poses of mutual benef­i­cence. The plea­sure we feel in com­edy, too, looks like a malig­nity in our nature; but why may not it, like the other, be resolved into an instinct work­ing us to some use­ful pur­pose with­out our concurrence?

The end of com­edy, like that of satire, is to cor­rect the dis­or­ders of mankind by exhibit­ing their faults and fol­lies in ridicu­lous and con­temptible atti­tudes. The ten­dency we feel to laugh at each other’s foibles, or at those mis­ad­ven­tures which denote weak­ness in us, being implanted by the hands of Prov­i­dence, was no doubt given to us for spe­cial pur­poses of good,; and in all prob­a­bil­ity to make men with­out the least inter­ven­tion of will or rea­son, moral guides and instruc­ters to each other. It is allowed by the sound­est philoso­phers that ridicule has a much bet­ter effect in cur­ing the vices and imper­fec­tions of men, than the most illus­tri­ous exam­ples of rigid virtue, whose duties are so sub­limed that they rather intim­i­date the greater part of mankind from the trial, than allure them to walk in their steps. The fol­low­ing def­i­n­i­tion of com­edy given by Aris­to­tle and adopted by Horace, Quin­til­ian, and Boileau, cor­re­sponds with these obser­va­tions: “Com­edy,” says the Stagyrite, “is an imi­ta­tion of the worst of men; when I say worst, I don’t mean in all sorts of vices, but only in the ridicu­lous, which are prop­erly defor­mi­ties with­out pain, and which never con­tribute to the destruc­tion of the sub­ject in which they exist.”

It has been remarked that the most severe satirists have been men of exem­plary good­ness of heart. The giant satirist Juve­nal, was a con­spic­u­ous illus­tra­tion of this truth. While his supe­rior intel­li­gence and sagac­ity unfolded to him in their full size the vices and fol­lies of his fellow-​​creatures, his supe­rior phil­an­thropy height­ened his indig­na­tion at them. The same may per­haps be said of the dra­matic satirists, or writ­ers of com­edy in gen­eral. We could adduce many instances to cor­rob­o­rate this asser­tion. That very man who stands unri­valled at the head of comic poetry, stands not less high in the esti­ma­tion of all who know him, for gen­eros­ity and benev­o­lence. If those who have tra­versed the life of the author of the School for Scan­dal with the great­est ill will to the man, were put to the ques­tion which they thought, his good-​​nature or his wit were the greater, they would prob­a­bly decide in favour of the former.

The most unami­able form in which com­edy has ever appeared, was that it assumed at its first rise in Greece. The char­ac­ter of the Athe­ni­ans was pecu­liarly favourable to it. The abbe Bru­moy who has dis­cussed the sub­ject with vast labour and tal­ent says, “gen­er­ally speak­ing, the Athe­ni­ans were vain, hyp­o­crit­i­cal, cap­tious, inter­ested, slan­der­ous, and great lovers of nov­elty.” A French author of con­sid­er­able note, mak­ing use of that peo­ple as an object of com­par­i­son, says, “Un peu­ple aussi malin et aussi railleur que celui d’ Athenes.” They were fond of lib­erty to dis­trac­tion, idol­aters of their coun­try, self­ish, and vain, and to an absurd excess scorn­ful of every thing that was not their own. Their tragic poets laid the unc­tion of flat­tery in unspar­ing mea­sure upon this foible of theirs, rep­re­sent­ing kings abased as a con­trast to their repub­li­can dig­nity; and with all their great­ness, it is easy to detect through their writ­ings, a lam­en­ta­ble propen­sity in their muse to play the par­a­site with the peo­ple. To their grat­i­fi­ca­tion of the pub­lic foible, the tragic poets no doubt owed some small part of that idol­a­try in which they were held by the Athen­ian mul­ti­tude. Yet no sooner did the comic writ­ers appear, ridi­cul­ing those very tragic poets, than they became still greater favourites with the peo­ple. Horace has trans­mit­ted to us the names of three of these comic poets, cotemporaries–Cratinus, Eupo­lis and Aristo­phanes. If there were any before them, their names are buried in obliv­ion. Tak­ing the struc­ture of the tragedies of Æschy­lus for their model, these com­menced the first great era of improve­ment in the comic drama. Of the come­dies of Crat­i­nus, Quin­til­ian speaks in great com­men­da­tion; the lit­tle of his poetry, how­ever, that remained is not thought to jus­tify that praise. Eupo­lis is related to have com­posed sev­en­teen plays at the age of sev­en­teen years. He was put to death by Alcib­i­ades for defama­tion, and died unla­mented except by a dog, which was so faith­fully attached to him that he refused to take food and starved to death upon his master’s tomb. So that of the three, Aristo­phanes alone lays claim here to par­tic­u­lar commemoration.

Per­haps there is not one char­ac­ter of antiq­uity upon which the opin­ions of mankind are divided, and so oppo­site to each other as that of Aristo­phanes. St. Chrysos­tom admired him so much that he always laid his works under his pil­low when he went to bed. Scaliger main­tained that no one could form a just judg­ment of the true Attic dialect who had not Aristo­phanes by heart. Of Madame Dacier’s idol­a­try he seems to be the god: while the ven­er­a­ble Plutarch objects to him that he car­ried all his thoughts beyond nature; that he wrote not to men of char­ac­ter but to the mob; that his style is at once obscure, licen­tious, trag­i­cal, pompous and mean—sometimes inflated and seri­ous to bombast—sometimes ludi­crous, even to pueril­ity; that he makes none of his per­son­ages speak in any dis­tinct char­ac­ter, so that in his scenes the son can­not be known from the father—the cit­i­zen from the boor—the hero from the shop­keeper, or the divine from the servant.

What­ever doubts may exist as to his tal­ents there can be none respect­ing his morals. To admit all that his pan­e­gyrists have said of his genius is but to aug­ment his deprav­ity, since by the most wicked and wan­ton per­ver­sion of that genius, he made it the suc­cess­ful instru­ment of the most base and bar­barous pur­poses. Against all that was great and wise and vir­tu­ous he with the most malev­o­lent indus­try turned the shafts of his poignant wit, his bril­liant imag­i­na­tion, and his solid knowl­edge. Cor­rupt­ing the comic muse from her legit­i­mate duty he seduced her from the pur­suit of her fair game, vice and folly, and made her fas­ten like a blood­hound upon those who were most emi­nent for moral and intel­lec­tual excel­lence. His car­i­ca­tur­ing of Sopho­cles and Euripi­des, and turn­ing their valu­able writ­ings into ridicule for the amuse­ment of the mob, may be forgiven—but the death of Socrates will never cease to draw upon Aristo­phanes the exe­cra­tion of every man who has the slight­est pre­ten­sions to virtue or honesty.

It is here to be observed that the com­edy of Greece is to be ranked under three dis­tinct heads. The plays com­posed of rib­aldry, defam­a­tory licen­tious­ness, inde­cency and loose jokes, which pre­vailed on the stage while the supreme power remained in the hands of the mul­ti­tude, con­sti­tute the first of these; and it goes by the name of the old com­edy. In those pieces no per­son what­ever was spared. Though they were so mod­elled and rep­re­sented as to deserve the name of reg­u­lar com­edy they were obscene, scur­rilous, and defam­a­tory. In them the most abom­inable false­hoods were fear­lessly charged upon men and women of all con­di­tions and char­ac­ters; not under fic­ti­tious names, nor by innu­endo, but directly and with the real name of the party, while the exe­crable calum­ni­a­tor, pro­tected by the licen­tious mul­ti­tude, boldly defied both the power of the law and the aveng­ing arm of the abused indi­vid­ual. Among that licen­tious peo­ple, nobody, not even the chief mag­is­trate nor the very judges them­selves, by whose per­mis­sion the come­di­ans were per­mit­ted to play, received any quar­ter, but were exposed to pub­lic scorn by any mer­ci­less wretch of a libeller who chose to sac­ri­fice them. Nor were the bad effects of these calum­nies con­fined to pub­lic scorn—they often went to the pecu­niary ruin of fam­i­lies; some­times, as in the case of Socrates, after­wards to the death of their object. At length the mis­cre­ants pro­ceeded to open impi­ety, and held up the gods, no less than men to derision.

These abuses con­tin­ued to con­t­a­m­i­nate the peo­ple and dis­grace the coun­try with daily aug­mented profli­gacy till a change took place in the gov­ern­ment, which took the admin­is­tra­tion from the mul­ti­tude and vested it in a few cho­sen men. The cor­rup­tions of the stage were then attended to, and the poets were restrained by law from men­tion­ing any man’s name on the stage. With this law ter­mi­nated that which is called the old com­edy.

So far was this law from pro­duc­ing the salu­tary effect expected from it, that it ren­dered the poi­son more mis­chie­vous by depriv­ing it of the gross­ness which in some degree oper­ated as an anti­dote to its bale­ful effects. The poets find­ing that cer­tain lim­its were pre­scribed to them, had recourse to greater inge­nu­ity, and by cun­ning trans­gressed the spirit while they obeyed the let­ter of the law. They fell to work upon well known real char­ac­ters, con­cealed under fic­ti­tious names; thereby not only excit­ing in the mul­ti­tude a keener rel­ish for their slan­ders, but giv­ing a more wide and exten­sive scope to the oper­a­tion of their mal­ice. When the name of the object was openly told, the calumny rested upon him alone—but when a fic­ti­tious name was held up, how­ever well known the real object might be, the slan­der was applied to many, and each spec­ta­tor fixed it upon that par­tic­u­lar per­son whom stu­pid­ity, mal­ice, or per­sonal hatred first sug­gested to him. Thus the hearts of the peo­ple were more cor­rupted by the more refined mal­ice of guess­ing the per­sons intended.

This is what has been denom­i­nated the mid­dle com­edy. In this par­tic­u­lar era it was that Aristo­phanes flour­ished, doing more mis­chief by his labours than all the wit which was lav­ished upon the Gre­cian mul­ti­tude in ages could coun­ter­bal­ance. The vir­u­lence of the canker, how­ever, at last enforced the neces­sity of a res­olute cure. The mag­is­trates inter­dicted the poets and play­ers not only from using real names but from rep­re­sent­ing real sub­jects. This admirable refine­ment pro­duced cor­re­spon­dent effects: com­edy assumed a new char­ac­ter, and acquired a new name. The poets being obliged to bring imag­i­nary sub­jects and fic­ti­tious names upon the stage, the safety of indi­vid­u­als from those butcher slan­der­ers was secured, and that safety begat tranquillity—thus the the­atre was grad­u­ally puri­fied and enriched; and shortly after Menan­der arose to dig­nify com­edy and res­cue the drama, and the pub­lic taste of Greece from bar­barism. This is the third divi­sion alluded to, and is called the new com­edy. A sad proof of the dan­ger to a nation of allow­ing a false or cor­rupt prac­tice to pre­vail for any time, arises from the sequel. The Athe­ni­ans were so viti­ated by the old and mid­dle com­edy that the new was dis­agree­able to them, so that it rose to no esti­ma­tion in the world till it was trans­ferred to Rome.

To his poignant wit, and poi­so­nous malig­nity, Aristo­phanes joined great intre­pid­ity of spirit. By the inde­fati­ga­ble exer­cise of his tal­ents he pro­ceeded, unre­strained by fear, unchecked by con­science, inac­ces­si­ble to shame or pity, and alike regard­less of the anger of foes and the feel­ings of friends, giv­ing to the mid­dle com­edy still more force and acu­men than ever belonged to the old. He cajoled the mul­ti­tude by a plau­si­ble affec­ta­tion of a vio­lent love for Athens, and an invet­er­ate hatred to all on whom he chose to fix the odium of wish­ing to enslave her. Though he was a Rho­dian by birth, he had the address to per­suade the Athen­ian mul­ti­tude that he was a native of Athens. Wit of a much more obtuse qual­ity than his could not fail of win­ning the hearts of such a peo­ple, if it were employed as his was in calum­ni­at­ing men of wis­dom, virtue and dignity.

An instance of his intre­pid­ity is worth relat­ing. The very first man he attacked was a man of vast power in Athens, named Cleo: for the pur­pose of expos­ing this man he wrote his com­edy of the Equi­tes. He could not, how­ever pre­vail upon any of the actors to incur the dan­ger of per­son­at­ing Cleo, so much were they intim­i­dated by the man’s power, wealth and influ­ence. He there­fore res­olutely deter­mined to play the char­ac­ter him­self; which he did with such dia­bol­i­cal abil­ity that the Athen­ian mul­ti­tude com­pelled the object of his defama­tion to reward him with no less a sum than five tal­ents; cast flow­ers upon his head; car­ried him through the streets, shout­ing applause, and made a decree that he should be hon­oured with a crown of the sacred olive in the citadel, as a dis­tinc­tion of the high­est kind that could be shown to a citizen.

The great­est admirer of this mis­chie­vous man was Madame Dacier, who trans­lated from the Greek, and read over no less than two hun­dred times his com­edy of The Clouds. A par­tial­ity which no doubt will be allowed to reflect much credit on that lady’s taste, moral as well as crit­i­cal, espe­cially when it is con­sid­ered that it was by that com­edy the death of Socrates was accom­plished. Socrates had expressed his dis­ap­pro­ba­tion of the licen­tious­ness of the comic poets, in their con­duct as well as writ­ings. This exas­per­ated Aristo­phanes, who, to accom­plish his revenge, con­spired with three prof­li­gates named Meli­tus, Lycon, and Any­tus, ora­tors and rhetori­cians, to destroy that god­like being. Defended by the rev­er­ence in which the peo­ple held him, Socrates was per­pet­u­ally secured from the fee­ble vil­lany of these three asso­ciates, till Aristo­phanes join­ing them, broke down by wit the bar­rier that pro­tected him. In the com­edy of the Clouds he threw the ven­er­a­ble old man into such forcible ridicule as over­set all the respect of the mob for his char­ac­ter, and all their grat­i­tude for his ser­vices, and they no longer paid the least rev­er­ence to the philoso­pher whom for fifty years Athens had regarded as a being of a supe­rior order. This accom­plished, the con­spir­a­tors stood forth to crim­i­nate him; and the philoso­pher was sum­moned before the tri­bunal of five hun­dred, where he was accused—first, of cor­rupt­ing the Athen­ian youth—secondly, of mak­ing inno­va­tions in religion—and thirdly, of ridi­cul­ing the gods which the Athe­ni­ans wor­shipped. To prove these evi­dent false­hoods, false wit­nesses were sub­orned, upon whose per­juries and the envy and mal­ice of the judges, the accusers wholly relied. They were not dis­ap­pointed. The judges expected from Socrates that abject sub­mis­sion, that mean­ness of behav­iour, and that ser­vil­ity of defence which they were accus­tomed to receive from ordi­nary crim­i­nals. In this they were deceived; and his firm­ness and uncom­ply­ing integrity is sup­posed to have accel­er­ated his fall.

The death of Socrates has always been con­sid­ered one of the most inter­est­ing and afflict­ing events in history—interesting as it exhibits in that illus­tri­ous philoso­pher the high­est dig­nity to which mere human nature has ever attained, and afflict­ing as it dis­plays in the Athe­ni­ans the low­est depth of base­ness to which nations may sink. In the his­tory of the Gre­cian drama it is nec­es­sar­ily intro­duced, as it serves to throw a light upon the effects pro­duced by the dra­matic poetry upon that peo­ple, and because a con­sid­er­a­tion of the man­ner of that philosopher’s death is insep­a­ra­bly con­nected with the char­ac­ter of the first of their comic poets, Aristo­phanes: this chap­ter there­fore will con­clude with a cir­cum­stan­tial rela­tion of that event, taken from a cel­e­brated historian:

Lysias, one of the most cel­e­brated ora­tors of the age, com­posed an ora­tion in the most splen­did and pathetic terms, and offered it to Socrates to be deliv­ered as his defence before the judges. Socrates read it; but after hav­ing praised the elo­quence and ani­ma­tion of the whole, rejected it, as nei­ther manly nor expres­sive of for­ti­tude; and com­par­ing it to Sicy­on­ian shoes, which though fit­ting, were proofs of effem­i­nacy, he observed that a philoso­pher ought to be con­spic­u­ous for mag­na­nim­ity, and for firm­ness of soul. In his defence he spoke with great ani­ma­tion, and con­fessed that while oth­ers boasted they knew every thing, he him­self knew noth­ing. The whole dis­course was full of sim­plic­ity and grandeur—the ener­getic lan­guage of offended inno­cence. He mod­estly said, that what he pos­sessed was applied for the ser­vice of the Athe­ni­ans. It was his wish to make his fellow-​​citizens happy, and it was a duty he per­formed by the spe­cial com­mand of the gods, “Whose author­ity,” said he emphat­i­cally to his judges, “I regard more than yours.” This lan­guage aston­ished and irri­tated the judges, and Socrates was con­demned by a major­ity of only three votes. When, accord­ing to the spirit of the Athen­ian laws, he was called upon to pass sen­tence on him­self, and to choose the mode of his death, he said, “For my attempts to teach the Athen­ian youth jus­tice and mod­er­a­tion, and to make the rest of my coun­try­men more happy, let me be main­tained at the pub­lic expense the remain­ing years of my life in the Pyr­ta­neum, an hon­our, O Athe­ni­ans which I deserve more than the vic­tors of the Olympic games: they make their coun­try­men more happy in appear­ance, but I have made you so in real­ity.” This exas­per­ated the judges still more, and they con­demned him to drink hem­lock. Upon this he addressed the court and more par­tic­u­larly the judges who had decided in his favour, in a pathetic speech. He told them that to die was a plea­sure, since he was going to hold con­verse with the great­est heroes of antiq­uity: he rec­om­mended to their pater­nal care his defence­less chil­dren, and as he returned to the prison, he exclaimed, “I go to die, you to live; but which is the best the divin­ity alone can know.”

The cel­e­bra­tion of the Delian fes­ti­vals sus­pended his exe­cu­tion for thirty days, dur­ing which he was loaded with irons; his friends, par­tic­u­larly his dis­ci­ples, were his con­stant atten­dants, he dis­coursed with them with his wonted cheer­ful­ness and serenity—one of them express­ing his grief that he should suf­fer, though inno­cent, Socrates replied, “would you then have me die guilty?”—with this com­po­sure he spent his last days, instruct­ing his pupils, and telling them his opin­ions in sup­port of the immor­tal­ity of the soul. And, oh what a majes­tic spec­ta­cle! dis­re­garded the entreaties of his friends, and when it was in his power to make his escape from prison refused it. Crito hav­ing bribed the jailor and made his escape cer­tain, urged Socrates to fly; “where shall I fly,” he replied, “to avoid the irrev­o­ca­ble doom passed on all mankind?” Chris­tians! won­der at this hea­then, and profit by his exam­ple! in his last days he enlarged upon the wicked crime of sui­cide, which he repro­bated with an acri­mony not usual with him, declar­ing it to be an inex­pi­able offence to the gods, and degrad­ing to man because the basest cowardice.

When the hour to drink the poi­son came, the exe­cu­tioner pre­sented him the cup, with tears in his eyes. Socrates received it with com­po­sure, and after he had made a liba­tion to the gods, drank it with an unal­tered coun­te­nance, and a few moments after expired. Thus did the vil­lanous libeller Aristo­phanes occa­sion the death of a man whom all suc­ceed­ing gen­er­a­tions have con­curred in pro­nounc­ing the wis­est and best of mankind, in the sev­en­ti­eth year of his age.

Let jus­tice record the sequel! Socrates was no sooner buried, than the Athe­ni­ans repented of their cru­elty. His accusers were despised and shunned; one was put to death; some were ban­ished, and oth­ers with their own hands put an end to a life which their cru­elty to the first of Athe­ni­ans had ren­dered insupportable.